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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. ! 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1 Case No. 860225 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the Order of October 9, 1985, res judicata and 
does it preclude the Order of March 19, 1986? 
2. Did the District Court commit reversible error in 
adopting the recommendations of Domestic Relations Commissioner 
Peuler without permitting the defendant/appellant an evidentiary 
hearing? 
3. Is the Order of March 19, 1986, erroneous in any 
event in construing or modifying the Decree of Divorce to give 
plaintiff the first option to acquire the family residence at the 
1975 appraised value? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASfe 
This is a post-judgment proceeding. These proceedings 
were commenced with an Affidavit for an Order to Show Cause 
verified and filed by the plaintiff April 15, 1985. (R.42-43) 
Shortly thereafter the defendant made a Motiion for Clarification 
of Decree filed April 26, 1985, (R.45-46) which motion was amended 
May 1, 198 5, (R.47-48) The Order to Show Cause and the Amended 
Motion for Clarification were heard by Commissioner Peuler on May 
7, 1985, and taken under advisement. (R.49) (It should be noted 
that apparently plaintiff's original Motion for Clarification 
through a mistake on the calendar came on for hearing on May 9, 
1985, and was stricken as neither counsel appeared. R.66) The 
Affidavit and the Motion dealt with the option to purchase the 
family home as set forth in paragraph 2(b) of the Stipulation 
executed by the parties and their attorneys on November 6, 1975, 
(R.15-17), and the said provision was incorporated in the Findings 
of Fact as paragraph 7 (R.23-26) and in the Decree of Divorce as 
paragraph 5. (R.20-22) 
On August 23, 1985, the Commissioner ruled on the 
matters which she had taken under advisement and denied the Order 
to Show Cause brought by the plaintiff for the reason that there 
was a failure to show that defendant had failed to exercise his 
option pursuant to the Stipulation. (R.51) No objections were 
ever made or filed by the plaintiff or her counsel, either to the 
recommendation or to the October 9th Order. After the time of the 
argument of the Order to Show Cause plaintiff's counsel, Nolan J. 
Olsen, withdrew as counsel July 19, 1985, (R.50), and Frank 
Pignanelli appeared September 13, 1985, as counsel for plaintiff. 
(R.54) although he had apparently advised Commissioner Peuler of 
his appearance as early as August 23, 1985, as his name appears on 
the Memorandum Decision. (R.51) 
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On September 23, 1985, (after the recommendation noted 
above and before the October 9 Order) plaintiff filed a new 
petition entitled "Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute 
Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree," (R.57) 
Defendant filed opposing Affidavits—one signed by defendant and 
the other by defense counsel, Leland K. Wilder (R.70-73), and 
that matter was thereafter heard September 30, 1985, and the 
Commissioner took the matter under advisement and made a 
recommendation later the same day and mailed it out to counsel 
October 1, 1985. (R.76-77) An Objection was timely filed to that 
recommendation October 3, 1985. (R.79) Th^n followed the October 
9th Order referred to hereinabove, and the said Verified Motion to 
Compel came before the Honorable David B. Dee on November 6, 198 5. 
(R.84) On that occasion Mr. Pignanelli, the plaintiff and 
plaintiff's husband appeared, as did defendant, with his 
attorneys, Mr. Wimmer and Mr. Madsen. The aforesaid persons were 
invited into the Judge's chambers. Judge Dee stated that he 
thought this was a default divorce, that his clerk was sick and 
that he did not have the file in this matter. There was 
apparently no court reporter available, however, the judge's 
bailiff was on duty. The judge then stateq that it was his 
general policy to uphold Commissioner Peul^r in every instance and 
stated in substance, "Why should we pay her (stating an amount) 
and then not follow her^recommendations?" Mr. Madsen then stated 
in substance that when a recommendation is rejected, it is the 
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duty of the judge to hear the matter and exercise his judgment. 
Counsel for the defendant then handed Judge Dee copies of some of 
the relevant documents from their own file (which documents have 
apparently been included in the court file at pages R.86-89). 
Judge Dee then informed the parties that he would not proceed 
further that day, but that he would obtain the file and review it. 
No other hearing was ever granted. 
Defendant was never afforded any further hearing, but 
several weeks later Judge Dee's clerk, Brad Willis, notified Kent 
Wimmer that the Court had ruled in favor of the plaintiff. 
Findings, Conclusions and a proposed Decree were then drafted by 
Mr. Pignanelli and submitted to counsel for the defendant. 
Counsel for defendant objected in writing to the same (R.90-91) on 
the grounds that there had been no evidentiary hearing and no 
findings could be made. Those Findings and Conclusions have 
apparently never been placed in the file and were apparently never 
signed by the judge. The Court nevertheless signed an Order on 
March 19, 1986, from which this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because there was no evidentiary hearing, there is no 
transcript of testimony. There is also no transcript of argument 
as no argument on the merits was ever permitted, and there was no 
court reporter present to even record the exchange between counsel 
and Judge Dee on November 6, 1985. 
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The primary matter to be considered in this action is 
the language of the original Stipulation, Findings of Fact and 
Decree of Divorce noted above, (R.15-17, R.20-22, R.23-26) which 
documents are set forth in full in the Addendum at the end of this 
brief. The language as it relates to the issue in this matter in 
the Stipulation, Findings and Decree is substantially the same, 
and we quote from paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce as follows: 
"Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the use of 
the home and real property located at 13227 South 2860 
West, Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of the 
mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of one of the 
following contingencies, to-wit: The remarriage of 
plaintiff, the youngest child reaches majority, or 
plaintiff desires to sell said home, at which time 
defendant shall have first option to purchase 
plaintiff's equity pursuant to an appraisal to be made 
forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said 
appraisal to be paid for by defendant^ and plaintiff 
shall have the option to purchase defendant's equity on 
the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the 
event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity, 
said equity to be based on an appraisal and 
determination as of the date of the occurrence of one of 
the above contingencies. In the event neither party 
exercises the option to purchase, the home shall be sold 
and defendant shall receive the equit^ pursuant to the 
Decree of Divorce and the present appraisal." 
Commissioner Peuler's Memorandum of August 23, 1985, and 
Judge Dee's Order of October 9, 1985, (botl^  of which are included 
in the Addendum hereto) affirm in effect tfte clear language of the 
said Decree of Divorce and further declare that there is no 
evidence that defendant failed to exercise his option, which 
option is a first option as set forth in the Decree. The second 
Memorandum Decision of Commissioner Peuler of September 30, 1985, 
and the Order of Judge Dee of March 19, 1986, (both of which are 
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included in said Addendum) totally rewrite the language of 
paragraph 5 of the Decreee of Divorce in that the said Order gives 
plaintiff the first option to acquire defendant's equity at the 
lower appraised value existing in 1975. 
Attached to the verified Motion to Compel of the 
plaintiff was an Exhibit Af (these documents are also included in 
the Addendum hereto) which consisted of a draft of an early 
Stipulation which was prepared prior to the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. The said Stipulation was never signed by anybody and was 
rejected by defendant at the time of the negotiations preceding 
the execution of the Stipulation of November 6, 1975f (R.15) and 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. The rejected Stipulation, as it 
relates to the matter of options on the family residence, differs 
from the wording of the executed Stipulation in that the terms 
"defendant" and "plaintiff" are reversed in six instances. That 
Stipulation, however was never signed, and the Stipulation that 
was signed (R.15) gives the defendant the first option. It is 
that executed Stipulation (R.15) which is incorporated in 
paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce. 
It should also be noted that the unexecuted Stipulation 
also varies in other respects from the Stipulation finally signed, 
such as the in amount of child support and attorney's fees. The 
uncontroverted Affidavit of Leland Kent Wimmer (R.72-73) categori-
cally states that there were no ambiguities or typographical 
errors in the drafting of the executed Stipulation, which was 
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incorporated in the Decree. Likewise, the Affidavit of the 
defendant (R.70) states that the Stipulation actually signed by 
the parties resulted from many hours of discussion with the 
plaintiff and that it was not the result of any typographical 
errors. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. The Order signed by Judge Dee on October 9, 
1985, is res judicata and precludes entry of the Order of March 
19, 1986, for the reason that the relief sought in the Order to 
Show Cause and the relief sought in the Motion to Compel are in 
the main identical and, although the Motion to Compel is somewhat 
broader than the Order to Show Cause, all additional issues 
existed at the time of the bringing of the Order to Show Cause and 
could and should have been included therein, and are determined 
and disposed of by that Order. Also, the Order dismissing the 
Order to Show Cause in effect affirms the obvious meaning of the 
Decree of Divorce wherein it affirms that the defendant had the 
first option to acquire the home and has not waived the same. The 
Motion to Compel is nothing more than an improper attempt to 
circumvent the Order entered on the Order to Show Cause. 
POINT II. The defendant was in any event entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on the Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to 
Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree. 
Even if the Court should find that the Motion to Compel is not 
precluded by doctrines of res judicata, defendant (having rejected 
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Commissioner Peuler's recommendation pursuant to Rule 8 of the 
Rules of the Third District Court) is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing on all of the matters raised in the said Motion to Compel. 
Such a hearing was not afforded the defendant. By the terms of 
the original Decree of Divorce, the defendant was given a 
substantial property right in the form of a first option to 
acquire the property at its value at the time of the Decree of 
Divorce. The District Court has now taken away that right from 
the defendant without giving the defendant an opportunity to have 
an evidentiary hearing on the matter, and thereby defendant has 
been denied due process of law. 
POINT III. Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is 
clear and unambiguous and not subject to being interpreted by 
parol evidence or by any considerations outside of the Decree, and 
furthermore, paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce is not subject 
to modification on any of the grounds alleged in the Order to Show 
Cause or Motion to Compel. There is no allegation of a material 
change of circumstances; the Decree resulted from a prolonged 
sequence of negotiations culminating in the execution by both 
parties and their counsel of a Stipulation which was approved by 
the court and incorporated in Findings of Fact and in the Decree 
of Divorce in 1975. 
The said Decree is clear and unambiguous, and its 
meaning can be determined from the four corners of the Decree. 
Furthermore, no proceeding under Rule 60(b) has ever been 
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undertaken by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's "intent," 
"understanding," and "belief" are irrelevant; the Stipulation, 
Findings and Decree were not the result of typographical errors; 
alleged "standard practice" was neither established, nor is it 
relevant; and the Decree cannot be modified at this date because 
of plaintiff's present feeling that it is "unfair." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ORDER SIGNED BY JUDGE DEE ON OCTOBER 9, 
1985, IS RES JUDICATA AND PRECLUDES ENTRY OF THE ORDER OF MARCH 
19, 1986. 
The Order to Show Cause filed herein on April 15, 1985, 
(R.42) (copy of which is included in Addendum hereto) asked the 
court to interpret the Decree of Divorce entered herein on 
November 21, 1975, (R.20) as granting to the defendant an equity 
in the home in question in the amount of $8,408.89 (together with 
one-half of the value of water stock amounting to $112.50 for a 
total of $8,521.39 and to require the defendant to execute a quit-
claim deed to the plaintiff upon receipt of said sum. The said 
Order of October 9, 1985, (R.80) denied said relief. 
The Order of March 19, 1986, (R.93) purports to grant 
to plaintiff the identical relief denied her by the prior Order of 
October 9, 1985. 
It is true that the plaintiff's Verified Motion to 
Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting 
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Clarification of Decree (copy is included in Addendum hereto) 
expands somewhat upon the grounds asserted in the Order to Show 
Cause. The Order to Show Cause basically asks the Court to 
interpret the Decree a certain way, and the Verified Motion to 
Compel also requests the Court to do the same, but goes beyond 
that and says in effect that the plaintiff signed the wrong 
Stipulation, apparently by mistake, and goes on to set forth what 
her understanding of the proper Stipulation was. 
The said motion also raises the issue as to whether or 
not defendant waived his first option. Nevertheless, all of those 
matters could have been raised in the initial Order to Show Cause. 
The alleged waiver relating to an offer of sale by plaintiff, for 
example, dates back to August 10, 1981, four years before the said 
Order to Show Cause was filed. It is axiomatic that a matter 
which could have been raised in the Order to Show Cause is barred 
by ruling on the Order to Show Cause and becomes res judicata with 
respect to that subject matter. 
We cite in support of the foregoing proposition 
Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P2d 379 (Utah 1974), where the 
court stated at page 380 the following: 
"In Wheadon v. Pearson this court stated that the 
doctrine of res judicata applied not only to points and 
issues which were actually raised and decided in a prior 
action but also as to those that could have been 
adjudicated, with the qualification that the claim, 
demand, or cause be the same in both cases. If the 
parties have had an opportunity to present their case 
and judgment is rendered thereon, it is binding both as 
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to those issues that were tried and to those that were 
triable in that proceeding, and they are precluded from 
further litigating the matter." 
See also Krofcheck v. Downey State Bank, 580 P2d 243 
(Utah 1978), and Penrod v. New Creation Cream, 669 P2d 873 (Utah 
1983) • 
Likewise plaintifffs alleged remarriage on March 26, 
1984, asserted as a waiver, was a matter that could have been 
raised in the original Order to Show Cause, but was not. It 
should be noted that paragraph 18 of the Motion to Compel is 
virtually identical with paragraph 3 of the Order to Show Cause. 
The motion also refers to "standard practice," which is 
entirely irrelevant, and also speaks in terms of "unfairness," 
which likewise is not a matter that can be canvassed at this late 
date. 
We cite in support Christensen v. Christensen, 619 P2d 
1372 (Utah 1980), which stated: 
" . . . we cannot now upset a stipulated property 
settlement because of her having relied upon values 
furnished by her husband in an adversary proceeding or 
because she was without funds to hire an appraiser of 
her own." 
Also, we cite Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P2d 412, (Utah 
1981). In that case the court stated: 
"Where a disposition of real property is in 
question . . . the court should properly be more 
reluctant to grant a modification. In the interest of 
securing stability in titles, modifications in a decree 
of divorce making disposition of real property are to be 
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granted only upon a showing of compelling reasons 
arising from a substantial and material change in 
circumstances. 
"The above holds true a fortiori where the property 
disposition is the product of an agreement and 
stipulation between the parties, and sanctioned by the 
trial court. Such a provision is the product of an 
agreement bargained for by the parties. As such the 
trial court should subsequently modify such a provision 
only with great reluctance and based upon compelling 
reasons." 
No such reasons have been advanced in this case, and 
the clear wording of the Decree of Divorce is not subject to 
modification ten years after the Decree was entered. 
It should be further noted that Lf plaintiff's 
contention is true, (that the word "plaintiff" and the word 
"defendant" were in the six instances interchanged), then 
plaintiff has the first option and defendant has no option to be 
waived. In order for defendant to have anything to waive, it must 
be conceded that the Decree means what it says and that the 
defendant had the first option. (If the Court should find that 
the language is clear and that defendant had the first option, but 
waived it, then the Order of March 19, 1986, is erroneous in any 
event because in that circumstance defendant would at least be 
entitled to one-half of the current equity. 
The clear and unequivocal meaning of paragraph 5 of the 
Decree of Divorce (R.20) is simply this: That plaintiff is 
granted the "use" of the home and is to pay the very modest 
mortgage payment thereon of $125 per month for such use. When 
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plaintiff remarries, or the youngest child reaches majority, or 
plaintiff desires to sell the home, defendant is given the option 
to acquire the home by paying to plaintiff her equity in the home 
determined by an appraisal at the time of the Decree of Divorce. 
If he does not elect to acquire the home, then the plaintiff is 
granted the option to acquire the home by paying the defendant his 
equity, which equity is in that event to be determined at a later 
date, being the time that plaintiff remarries, the youngest child 
reaches majority, or plaintiff desires to sell the home. The 
Decree goes on to provide what will take place if neither party 
desires to acquire the home, but that provision is irrelevant to 
this proceeding as it is clear that both parties desire to acquire 
the home. 
The Order to Show Cause of the plaintiff filed on April 
15, 1985, (R.42) purports to interpret paragraph 5 of the 
aforesaid Decree of Divorce in two respects, both of which are 
erroneous. First, it presupposes that the defendant has waived 
his first option and goes on to assume that even if he has waived 
it, that plaintiff has the right to acquire his interest at the 
1975 value. The fact of the matter is that, even if the defendant 
had waived his option to purchase her equity at the 1975 value, 
she only has the right to acquire his equity at the later value at 
the time of the occurrence of one of the contingencies. 
Defendant's equity in the property at the later date would be 
computed as follows: The property was worth approximately $70,000 
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at the occurrence of the first contingency and there was a balance 
owing on the mortgage at that time of approximately $14,000, a 
difference of $56,000, and defendant's one-half would be $28,000, 
an increase to him (over plaintiff's offer) of about $19,500. 
In any event that was the relief sought by the plaintiff 
in the said Order to Show Cause. That matter was heard before 
Commissioner Peuler on May 7, 1985, (R.49) at which time the 
Commissioner took the matter under advisement and rendered her 
recommendation on August 23, 1985, (R.51). The Order of the Court 
incorporating her recommendation (no objection having been made by 
the plaintiff) with approval endorsed thereon by Commissioner 
Peuler was signed and entered by Judge Dee on October 9, 1985. 
(R.80) 
Subsequent to Commissioner Peulerfs making said 
recommendation on August 23, 1985, the plaintiff attempted to 
circumvent that ruling by filing what she termed a "Verified 
Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-Claim Deed and 
Requesting Clarification of Decree. In said motion the plaintiff 
sought to have the Court interpret the aforesaid Decree of Divorce 
in the same manner as the plaintiff had sought in her Order to 
Show Cause, to-wit, she wanted the Court to interpret the Decree 
as providing that the plaintiff had the first right to acquire the 
property from the defendant by payment to him of one-half the 
value of the property as of the date of the Decree of Divorce. 
The said motion was filed on September 23, 1985, subsequent to the 
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recommendation of Commissioner Peuler on August 23, 1985, 
recommending denial of the Order to Show Cause. 
We respectfully submit that a party cannot circumvent 
the recommendation of the Commissioner and subsequent decision of 
the Court based thereon by the simple expedient of filing another 
proceeding under a different title, but containing a request for 
the identical relief. 
POINT II. THE DEFENDANT WAS IN ANY EVENT ENTITLED TO AN 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE VERIFIED MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT TO 
EXECUTE QUIT-CLAIM DEED AND REQUESTING CLARIFICATION OF DECREE. 
Even if the Court should feel that the relief sought in 
the "Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-Claim 
Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree" (R.57) is not 
precluded by the Court's Order of October 9, 1985, defendant was 
nevertheless entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on said 
petition, which defendant has been denied. 
The Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-
Claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree was filed on 
September 23, 1985, and was heard before Commissioner Peuler on 
September 30, 1985, at which time the matter was taken under 
advisement by her. Apparently later on that day the Commissioner 
reached her decision and filed a Memorandum Decision dated 
September 30, 1985, which she mailed to counsel the next day, 
October 1, 1985. On October 3, 1985, the defendant filed an 
Objection and demand for further hearing (R.79), and the 
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said request constituted a timely and proper request for a full 
hearing before Judge David B. Dee, defendant having thus rejected 
the recommendation of the Commissioner, See Rule 8 of the Third 
District Court Rules in the Addendum hereto. 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel was indeed noticed up for 
hearing before Judge Dee on the 6th day of November, 1985. On 
that occasion, as noted before, Mr. Pignanelli and the plaintiff 
and plaintiff's husband appeared, as did the defendant and his 
attorneys. The aforesaid persons, being six in all, were invited 
into the judge's chambers. As noted above, he initially stated 
that he thought this was a default divorce case, that his clerk 
was sick and he did not have the file. The judge then stated in 
substance that it is his general policy to uphold the Commissioner 
in every instance, suggesting that why else was she on the 
payroll. Counsel for the defendant requested a hearing (pursuant 
to said Rule 8 as the Commissioner's recommendation had been 
timely rejected) and, although entitled to such a hearing under 
said Rule 8, no such hearing was afforded. The Court accepted 
copies of several of the documents inasmuch as he did not have the 
file and said that he would get the file and look it over. It is* 
clear from the foregoing that the defendant was never granted an 
appropriate hearing in the premises and was denied due process of 
law as vested property rights were taken from the defendant 
without just cause and without a hearing. The defendant was 
entitled to have the Court hear testimony on all issues, including 
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the issue of waiver and to hear testimony on the meaning of the 
Decree should it be determined that the Decree was in any way 
ambiguous. No record was made of the proceedings, no court 
reporter was present, nor any recording device. The whole episode 
took place in chambers, and in the context of the Court's 
statement that he always upheld Commissioner Peuler1 
recommendations. 
POINT III. PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IS 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION ON ANY 
OF THE GROUNDS ALLEGED IN EITHER THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR THE 
MOTION TO COMPEL. 
It is the contention of the defendant that even if the 
decree of October 9, 1985, is not res judicata as to the Order of 
March 19, 1986, and even if defendant had been afforded an 
appropriate evidentiary hearing, paragraph 5 of the Decree of 
Divorce is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to change upon 
any of the grounds alleged in either the Order to Show Cause of 
the Verified Motion to Compel. We will canvass the grounds 
separately: 
1. In the Order to Show Cause no ground is given 
except that it is asserted that the Decree of Divorce is subject 
to an interpretation as claimed by the plaintiff. A fair reading 
of the Decree shows that that claim is entirely inaccurate. The 
Decree, as it relates to the option of the defendant and the 
option of the plaintiff (which are the only items at issue) is 
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entirely clear. Under established law, where the Decree is clear, 
no clarification or explanatory testimony is acceptable, and the 
Court is required to enforce the document according to its clear 
meaning as ascertained from the four corners of the Decree. 
In Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign Company, 
586 P2d 446 (Utah 1978), the Supreme Court stated at page 450: 
"If the language of a judgment be clear and 
unambiguous, it must be enforced as it speaks. However, 
when the meaning is obscure or ambiguous, the entire 
record may be resorted to for the purpose of construing 
the judgment." 
The Supreme Court of Utah stated in Larsen v. Larsen, 
561 P2d 1077 (Utah 1977), at page 1079 as follows: 
"Mrs. Larsen did not appeal from the decree, and 
neither she nor the state have proceeded under Rule 
60(b), U.R.C.P., to obtain relief from the decree. 
Furthermore, the trial court specifically found the 
support obligation was just and proper . . . " 
In this case plaintiff did not appeal the decision, has 
not proceeded under Rule 60(b) and, as in the Larsen case, the 
court specifically found in Finding No. 7 (R.23) that the 
provision for distribution of the house was "fair and reasonable." 
Even if the plaintiff had grounds to vacate the Decree 
under Rule 60(b), such proceeding would have to be brought within 
three months after the entry of the Decree if it is to be done in 
the same action. Although Rule 60(b) seems to indicate that a 
separate action may be permissible, none has been brought in this 
case, and the plaintiff would probably be precluded from doing so 
in any event by laches. 
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2. Plaintiff's "intent" or plaintiff's "understanding" 
or plaintiff's "belief" was that defendant would not have a first 
option (see paragraphs 6, 7 & 8 of Verified Motion to Compel-R.58) 
The subjective intent, understanding or belief of a 
party is irrelevant once a stipulation has been negotiated, signed 
by the parties and their attorneys, approved by the court, and 
entered in the Decree of Divorce. 
In Land v. Land, 605 P2d 1248 (Utah 1980), the Court 
stated the following at page 1251: 
" . . . when a decree is based upon a property 
settlement agreement, forged by the parties and 
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such agreement 
into consideration. Equity is not available to 
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted 
away simply because one has come to regret the bargain 
made. Accordingly the law limits the continuing 
jurisdiction of the court where property settlement 
agreement has been incorporated into the decree, and the 
outright abrogation of the provisions of such agreement 
is only to be resorted to with great reluctance and for 
compelling reasons." 
See also Despain v. Despain, 627 P2d 526 (Utah 1981), 
and Lea v. Bowers, 658 P2d 1213 (Utah 1983)|. 
It is well-established that in the interpretation of 
contracts, as well as judicial instruments, subjective intention 
is irrelevant, and the documents are to be given the fair meaning 
which an objective reading thereof yields. 
3. Plaintiff alleges that there were "typographical 
errors" in the Decree of Divorce. See paragraph 10 of said 
verified motion. It is clear that we are here not dealing with 
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"typographical errors," but rather with the desire of the 
plaintiff to have the court rewrite the Decree of Divorce in 
accordance with the provisions of the rejected and unsigned 
Stipulation. In order to have the Decree of Divorce conform to 
that Stipulation, the word "defendant" in paragraph 5 of the 
Decree would have to be changed to "plaintiff" three times, and 
the word "plaintiff" would have to be changed to "defendant" three 
times. Six changes in all, and that is certainly more than a 
typographical error. Furthermore, if the appropriate changes were 
then made in the Findings of Fact and in the original Stipulation, 
at least 18 changes would have to be made, and it is clear that we 
are not dealing with any kind of typographical or clerical error. 
Furthermore, although plaintiff attempts to put the 
blame on Attorney Nolan Olsen for not carrying out her 
instructions, it must be noted that the plaintiff's own signature 
is on the Stipulation which was finally signed by the parties and 
their attorneys (R.15-17), and it is upon that Stipulation that 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R.23-26) and Decree of 
Divorce (R.20-22) were based. 
It should also be noted that the divorce was obtained by 
plaintiff, and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce were drafted by plaintiff's own attorney, not 
defendant's. It is not realistic to suppose that the parties made 
18 errors through oversight. The Stipulation, Findings and Decree 
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were drafted as they were because that was the negotiated 
agreement of the parties as approved by the court, 
4. In paragraph 24 of the Motion to Compel plaintiff 
asserts that there is a "standard practice" in these matters, 
which standard practice in her belief would have lead to a 
different agreement. We do not believe that there is any standard 
practice in this matter, but in any event, it is the agreement of 
the parties as approved by the Court that is determinative, not 
any such standard practice. This is just another way of saying 
that the Decree does not conform with plaintiff's present desires 
and she wished now to have the Court rewrite the Decree in 
accordance with some theoretical "standard practice." As noted in 
the Land case above, this is not permissi bie. 
5. The plaintiff claims that the Decree is "unfair" as 
written. (See paragraph 25 of the Motion to Compel.) This of 
course constitutes no basis for a modification of the Decree of 
Divorce as noted in the Land case, supra. It is axiomatic that a 
Decree of Divorce can only be modified upon a material, permanent 
change of circumstances, and not because the plaintiff—ten years 
after entry of the Decree—claims that it is unfair. 
6. The plaintiff asks that the Court clarify the 
Decree. See paragraph 26 (R.62). As noted above, clarification 
of a Decree may be appropriate where the language is ambiguous, 
but where the language is clear, no such interpretation is 
permitted. If the plaintiff is using the word "clarify" in the 
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sense of asking the Court to enforce the order as written, then 
such a request is no doubt appropriate, but if the Decree is to be 
enforced as written, then it is defendant who has the first option 
to purchase the property, not the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
It is defendant's position that the Order of the Court 
of October 9, 1986, denying plaintiff's Order to Show Cause is res 
judicata and determinative of the issues in this action, and that 
it precludes the Order of March 19, 1986. Even if the foregoing 
position is rejected, it is clear that defendant timely objected 
to the recommendation of Commissioner Peuler and requested a 
hearing and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing before Judge 
Dee with a court reporter present and a record kept of the 
proceedings. It is the position of the defendant that the Court 
could have denied plaintiff relief based upon the doctrine of res 
judicata, but before the Court could rule for the plaintiff, it 
would be necessary to hear evidence on all of the conflicting 
factual assertions. That is certainly true if the plaintiff is to 
be permitted to get into matters such as her "intention," her 
"belief," her "understanding," "typographical errors," "standard 
practice," "unfairness" and the like. So, at the very least, if 
the foregoing assertions of the plaintiff are to be entertained by 
the Court, defendant is entitled to put on his evidence and 
testimony with respect to each of those matters. 
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Finally, it is defendant's position that none of the 
aforesaid matters could appropriately be canvassed by the Court at 
this late date and that, had the matter been heard, the Court 
would be compelled as a matter of law to overrule the contentions 
of the plaintiff and rule in favor of the defendant in any event. 
We respectfully submit that this Court can and should rule against 
the plaintiff as a matter of law, but if defendant is in error in 
that belief, then at least defendant is entitled to his day in 
court with respect to any factual issues which the Court believes 
could properly be raised by the plaintiff ten years after entry of 
the Decree. 
For the aforesaid reasons, it is the position of the 
defendant that the aforesaid Decree of Divorce does grant the 
defendant a first option, that the language of the Decree is clear 
and unequivocal and should be enforced as written, and that no 
extraneous evidence is necessary or proper. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LELAND KENT WIMMER 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
KIM CLEGG 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief with 
Addendum were mailed to Frank R. Pignanelli, attorney for 
defendant/respondent, at his address, 48 Post Office Place, 3rd 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, this 
day of August, 1986. 
Attorney Eor Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
Items in the Addendum are referred to by the same page 
numbers as in the Record and in the same order. 
Contents of Addendum: 
Stipulation, R.15-17. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, R.23-26. 
Decree of Divorce, R.20-22. 
Affidavit for Order to Show Cause, R.42-43. 
Recommendation (August 23, 1983), R.51. 
Verified Motion to Compel, R.57-69. 
Recommendation (September 30, 1985), R.76-77. 
Order, R.80. 
Order, R.93-95. 
Rule 8, Third District Court Rul^s. 
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^ 
L E L A N D K. W I M M E R 
Attorney for Defendant 
600 Utah Savings Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 533-0538 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN A N D F O R S A L T L A K E C O U N T Y , S T A T E O F U T A H 
- ' » ' > ( \ * P c 
GAYLA HATCH, 
plaintiff, 
- v s -
S T I P ULA T I O N 
Civil No. D- 18898 MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
defendant. 
Plaintiff and defendarthereby stipulate and agree together with thei r 
respect ive a t torneys , subject to the approval of the Court, as follows: 
1. Defendant hereby consents that his default be entered in this action 
by the court , and waives his appearance in said action.and consent that 
plaintiff proceed to a hearing upon her complaint in accordance with the follow 
ing t e r m s . 
2. Plaintiff shall thereupon present evidence to the court in support of 
the allegations of her complaint on file here in . If the court deems such 
evidence sufficient to award to plaintiff a Decree of Divorce from defendant, 
then said Decree , subject to the approval of the court , shall provide as 
follows: 
a. Plaintiff may be awarded the ca re , custody and control of the two 
minor children of the par t ies , to-wit : J a m e s Craig Hatch and Vanessa Kay 
Hatch, subject to the right of reasonable visi tat ions by the defendant. 
K / f 
b. Plaintiff may be awarded the use of the home and rea l proper ty 
located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of 
the mortgage thereon, until the occur rence of one of the following contin-
gencies , to-wit: The r e m a r r i a g e of plaintiff, the youngest child r eaches 
majority, or plaintiff d e s i r e s to sel l said home, at which t ime defendant 
shall have f irst option to purchase plaintiffTs equity pursuant to an appra isa l 
to be made forthwith to de termine the equity as of this date, said appra i sa l 
to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff shall have theoption to purchase 
defendant's equity on the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the 
event defendant does not purchase plaintiffTs equity, said equity to be based 
on an appra isa l and determinat ion as of the date of the occurrence of one of 
the above contingencies. In the event nei ther party exe rc i ses the option to 
purchase , said home would be sold and defendant would receive the equity 
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the present appraisa l . 
c. Plaintiff may be awarded as her sole and separate property the 
furnityre, furnishings and fixtures, the 1970 Buick Riviera automobile and 
her personal belongings. 
d. Defendant may be awarded as his sole and separa te proper ty the 
1968 Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and the personal proper ty in 
his possession and control. 
e. Plaintiff shall be ordered to assume and discharge the obligation due 
F a r m Home Administrat ion on the mortgage on the hom$ and defendant shall 
be ordered to assume and discharge all other debts and obligations as set 
£ i ? 4 lb 
forth by the divorce Complaint, as well as any and all other debts and obliga-
tions incurred pr ior to filing of this divorce, by the par t ies during the i r 
marr iage . 
f. Defendant shall be ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of $100. 00 per 
child per month, for the support and maintenance of the two minor children 
of the parties* 
g. Defendant shall be ordered to maintain medical insurance on the 
minor children and maintain his present life insurance naming the minor 
children as beneficiar ies thereon, through operation engineers so long as 
defendant is elegable to do so. 
h. Plaintiff shall be awarded no alimony. 
i. Plaintiff ag rees to continue existing m a r r i a g e counseling, 
j . Each party shall assume and pay their own attourney fees and court 
cos t s . 
DATED this Q &\y day of * / ^ H > ^ y , t U l / 1975 
il \L 
GAYLA HATCH, Plaintiff 
/ ^ / 
NOLAN-J. OLSEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, Defendant 
new K Mf\imc.\ 
LELAND K. WIMMER, 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah Savings Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
0 0 0 0 ] 7 
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NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
255.7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAYLA HATCH, 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs. : 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, : 
Civil No. D.18898 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing 
on the 21st day of November, 1975, before this court, the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., Judge presiding, and the plaintiff having appeared 
in person and by her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, and the defendant and his 
attorney, Leland K. Wimmer, having consented in a Stipulation dated the 
6th day of November, 1975, that plaintiff may proceed to present her 
evidence without further notice, and the court having read and approved 
the Stipulation on file herein, and the plaintiff having been sworn and 
testified concerning the allegations of her Complaint, and the court 
having been fully advised in the premises, and upon motion of Nolan J. 
Olsen, attorney for plaintiff, the court makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant were actual and bona fide residents 
rt T> > 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That the Complaint herein has been on file for more than 
ninety (90) days. 
3. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband, having been 
married at Elko, Elko County, State of Nevada, on the 16th day of 
December, 1962. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant have two (2) minor children as issue 
of this marriage, to.wit: James Craig Hatch, born May 30, 1967, and 
Vanessa Kay Hatch, born November 22, 1970. 
5. That the aforementioned children are in the care, custody 
and control of the plaintiff, who as their mother is a fit and proper 
person to be awarded their care, custody and control, subject to the 
right of reasonable visitations by the defendant. 
6. During the course of this marriage, the defendant has 
treated the plaintiff cruelly by being argumentative, by remaining away 
from the home of the parties for long and unreasonable times, and by 
various and other conduct, which has caused the plaintiff great mental 
anguish, physical distress and suffering. 
7. It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded the 
use of the home and real property located at 13227 South 2860 West, 
Riverton, Utah, subject to the payment of the mortgage thereon, until 
the occurrence of one of the following contingencies, to-wit: the 
remarriage of plaintiff, the youngest child reaches majority, or the 
plaintiff desires to sell said home, at which time defendant shall have 
first option to purchase plaintiff* s equity pursuant to an appraisal to 
be made forthwith to determine the equity as of this date, said appraisal 
to be paid for by defendant, and plaintiff shall have the option to 
purchase defendants equity on the occurrence of any of the above con-
tingencies in the event defendant does not purchase plaintiff's equity, 
said equity to be based on an appraisal and determination as of the date of 
the occurrence of one of the above contingencies. In the event neither 
party exercises the option to purchase, the home shall be sold and 
defendant shall receive the equity pursuant to the Decree of Divorce 
and the present appraisal. 
8. It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded as 
her sole and separate property the furniture, furnishings and fixtures, 
the 1970 Buick Riviera automobile and her personal belongings, and it 
is fair and reasonable that defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the 1968 Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and 
the personal property in his possession and control. 
9. It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be ordered to 
assume and discharge the obligation due Farm Home Administration on the 
mortgage on the home, and it is fair and reasonable that defendant be 
ordered to assume and discharge the obligations due Walker Bank and Trust 
Company, two accounts, $950.00 and $1,000.00, liens on the 1970 Buick 
automobile and the 1968 Dodge pickup; Sears, $300.00; Walker Bankard, 
$350.00; Alden's, $250.00; and any and all other debts and obligations 
incurred by the parties during their marriage up to the date of the 
filing of the Complaint herein on July 18, 1975, and hold plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
10. It is fair and reasonable that defendant be ordered to pay 
to plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per child per month, a total of $200.00 
per month, for the support and maintenance of the two minor children of 
the parties. 
11. It is fair and reasonable that plaintiff be awarded no 
alimony. 
12. It is fair and reasonable that defendant be ordered to 
maintain medical insurance on the two minor children, and to maintain 
his present life insurance naming the minor children as beneficiaries 
thereon. 
13. It is fair and reasonable that each party be ordered to 
assume and pay their own attorney fees and court costs. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the 
following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. Plaintiff should be granted a Decree of Divorce on the 
grounds of mental cruelty. 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the two minor children of the parties, subject to the right of 
reasonable visitations by the defendant. 
3. Plaintiff and defendant should be awarded property as set 
forth in the Findings of Fact above. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant should be ordered to assume and 
discharge the debts and obligations as set forth in the Findings of 
Fact above. 
p2-^ + Zk 
5. Defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff the sura of 
$100*00 per child per month, a total of $200.00 per month, for the support 
and maintenance of the two minor children of the parties. 
6. Plaintiff should be awarded no alimony. 
7. Defendant should be ordered to maintain medical insurance 
on the minor children, and to maintain his present life insurance naming 
the minor children as beneficiaries thereon. 
8. That each party should be ordered to assume and pay their 
own attorney fees and court costs. 
DATED this r.^AL <*ay of , 1975. 
BY THE COURT: 
*f 
J U D G E v 
" ATTEST -
3oi l' C r 
tt^u 
NOL^N J. OLSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
255.7176 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
G A Y L A HATCH, 
Plaintiff, : DECREE OF DIVORCE 
: 1&\<13b K\o.q4S 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, : 
Civil No* D.18898 
Defendant. : 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing 
on the 21st day of November, 1975, before this court, the Honorable 
Stewart M« Hanson, Sr., Judge presiding, and the plaintiff having appeared 
in person and by her attorney, Nolan J. 01 sen, and the defendant and his 
attorney, Leland K. yimmer, having consented in a Stipulation dated the 
6th day of November, 1975, that plaintiff may proceed to present her 
evidence without further notice, and the court having read and approved 
the Stipulation on file herein, and the plaintiff having been sworn and 
testified concerning the allegations of her Complaint, and the court 
having been fully advised in the premises, and the court having hereto, 
fore made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
upon motion of Nolan J» Olsen, attorney for plaintiff, 
Cfy, 
os 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between 
the plaintiff, GAYLA HATCH, and the defendant, MICHAEL HALL HATCH, be, 
and the same are hereby dissolved, providing, however, that the Decree 
shall not become final until three (3) months from the date hereof, 
during which time neither of the parties hereto shall remarry, which 
Decree will become final without further notice or proceedings, unless 
either of the parties hereto or the court on its own motion shall 
institute further proceedings herein. 
2. Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the care, custody 
and control of the two (2) minor children of the parties, tcwit: James 
Craig Hatch, born May 30, 1967, and Vanessa Kay Hatch, born November 22, 
1970, subject to the right of reasonable visitations by the defendant. 
3. Defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff 
the sum of $100.00 per child per month, a total of $200.00 per month, for 
the support and maintenance of the two (2) minor children of the parties. 
4. Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded no alimony. 
5. Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded the use of the 
home and real property located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, Utah, 
subject to the payment of the mortgage thereon, until the occurrence of 
one of the following contingencies, to.wit: the remarriage of plaintiff, 
the youngest child reaches majority, or the plaintiff desires to sell 
said home, at which time defendant shall have first option to purchase 
plaintiff*s equity pursuant to an appraisal to be made forthwith to 
determine the equity as of this date, said appraisal to be paid for by 
defendant, and plaintiff shall have the option to purchase defendants 
equity on the occurrence of any of the above contingencies in the 
event defendant does not purchase plaintiff*s equity, said equity to be 
based on an appraisal and determination as of the date of the occurrence 
of one of the above contingencies. In the event neither party exercises 
the option to purchase, the home shall be sold and defendant shall receive 
the equity pursuant to the Decree of Divorce and the present appraisal* 
6. Plaintiff be, and she is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property the furniture, furnishings and fixtures, the 1970 
Buick Riviera automobile and her personal belongings, and defendant be, 
and he is hereby awarded as his sole and separate property the 1968 
Dodge pickup and his personal belongings and the personal property in 
his possession and control. 
7. Plaintiff be, and she is hereby ordered to assume and 
discharge the obligation due Farm Home Administration on the mortgage 
on the home, and defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to assume and 
rZ z - i 
discharge the obligations due Walker Bank and Trust Company, two accounts, 
$950.00 and $1,000,00, liens on the 1970 Buick automobile and the 1968 
Dodge pickup; Sears, $300.00; Walker Bankard, $350.00; Alden's, $250.00; 
and any and all other debts and obligations incurred by the parties during 
their marriage up to the date of the filing of the Complaint herein on July 
18, 1975, and hold plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
8. Defendant be, and he is hereby ordered to maintain medical 
insurance on the two minor children, and to maintain his present life 
insurance naming the minor children as beneficiaries thereon. 
9. Plaintiff and defendant be, and they are each ordered to 
assume and pay their own. attorney fees and court costs. 
4 All DATED t h i s . ^ ^ 1 day of
 y[ ^ n T / c , 1975. 
BY THE COURT: 
T U T G T 
ATTEST 
l£%?8*/&U. 
DV 
r ~ o i i f . f i r 
^ •2. 2 -
NOLAN J. OLSEN 
Utah State Bar No. 2464 
OLSEN & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
8138 South State Street 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: 255-7176 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GAYLA HATCH (ANDERSON), 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
Defendant« 
AFFIDAVIT FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D-18898 
Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
GAYLA HATCH (ANDERSON), being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That she is the plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
2. That she was granted a Decree of Divorce on November 21, 1975. 
3. That pursuant to said Decree of Divorce, paragraph 7, defendant 
was awarded an equitable interest in said home, said sum being the sum of 
38,408.89 together with one-half (\) of the value of water stock which 
value is the sum of $112.50, a total being $8,521.39. 
4. That plaintiff on or about April 7, 1984, made arrangements 
for a loan to pay said sum, however, defendant failed and refused to sign 
a Quit Claim Deed and receive his money. 
5. That on October 1984, plaintiff" had her attorney remit to 
defendant, a letter requesting a closing and defendant failed and refused 
to provide notice to plaintiff's counsel agreeing to said closing. 
<L^ 
6. That it has been necessary for plaintiff to employ counsel 
in bringing this action. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that an Order to Show Cause be made 
and entered by the Court requiring plaintiff to show cause, if any he may 
have: 
1. Why he should not execute a Quit Claim Deed on the property 
located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, Utah, and place said Quit 
Claim Deed in escrow and accept the sum of $8,529.39 as his equity in 
the home and real property pursuant to the Divcrce Decree. 
2. Why plaintiff should not be granted judgment against the 
defendant for reasonable attorney's fees for the use and benefit of 
plainti£f*s counsel herein. 
DATED this J ? day of APRIL, 1985. 
$(Q/AL JJgjfiM (Zr$JW*) 
GAYLA^iATCH (ANDERSON) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this^ _day of APRIL, 1985, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing a~k-* 
7ffrjy 
Residing ^ atr* / , />A / / / '/i 
44? 
CoiUirtyl fef ?Salt:Lake - State of Utah 
FILE NO. 
TITLE: ( • PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (• COUNSEL PRESENT) 
^=>cu lAcgdcK F: 
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CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAILIFF 
JUDGI 
DATE: 
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Frank P. Pignanelli (4392) ' \? ^ . . ? ^ ^ S . O F F : C E 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS " *n 
Attorneys for Defendant <JFD o3 
Third Floor, New York Building t v/f *-'-• ^ o 'yji 
48 Post Office Place *^ft&te/l&1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 Rf_/ __ 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 ' " 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
GAYLA HATCH (ANDERSON), 
Plaintiff, 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED MOTION TO COMPEL 
DEFENDANT TO EXECUTE 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED AND REQUESTING 
CLARIFICATION OF DECREE 
Civil No. D-18898 
Judge 
ooOoo • 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff Gayla Hatch Anderson, by and through 
the undersigned counsel of Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, and 
hereby moves this Court for an Order compelling Defendant to 
execute a Quit-Claim Deed on the property located at 13 227 South 
2860 West, Riverton, Utah, and accept the sum of $8,529.39 as his 
equity in the home and real property pursuant to the Decree of 
Divorce entered in the above-entitled matter and, further, for an 
Order from this Court clarifying and determining the present and 
future rights of Plaintiff and Defendant in regards to the 
above-described property. 
This Motion is based upon, but not limited to, the 
following: 
(L'JI 
1. Plaintiff was granted a Decree of Divorce on November 
21, 1975. 
2. Prior to the Default Hearing on November 21, 1975, 
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an Agreement and Stipulation 
which provided for, among other things, how the parties' marital 
residence was to be disposed of and provided for in an equitable 
fashion. 
3. The Plaintiff's former counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, prepared 
a Stipulation (attached as Exhibit "A," incorporated by reference 
herein), and in accordance to Plaintiff's instructions, said 
Stipulation, provided that Plaintiff would have the first option 
to purchase Defendant's equity in the parties' marital residence 
in the event the established contingencies were to occur. 
4. The Plaintiff, never waivered from her instructions to 
her previous counsel that the above-described disposition of the 
home should be set forth in the Decree of Divorce. 
5. The Plaintiff, on the instructions of her previous 
counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, signed a Stipulation which was 
eventually entered and filed with this Court, and Plaintiff was 
never notified that said Stipulation contained language which 
varied from her above-described intent and understanding as to 
the disposition of the parties' marital residence. 
6. That the language contained in paragraph 5 of the Decree 
of Divorce entered by this Court on November 21, 19^5, did not 
accurately reflect Plaintiff's intent and understanding as to the 
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disposition of the parties' marital residence pursuant to the 
Agreement and Stipulation Plaintiff and Defendant entered into. 
7. That it is Plaintiff's understanding that she was to 
have the first option to purchase Defendant's equity as of the 
date of the Decree of Divorce, and that ^ Defendant would have the 
option to purchase Plaintiff's equity in the event that Plaintiff 
did not purchase Defendant's equity on the occurrence of the 
described contingencies. 
8. That it is Plaintiff's belief and understanding that it 
is standard practice that the party who assumes the mortgage and 
continues to live in the marital residence has the first option 
to buy out the other party in the event of one of the 
contingencies to occur, and it was this standard practice that 
Plaintiff wished to have incorporated into the Decree of Divorce 
on November 21, 1975. 
9. That Plaintiff, in accordance with her understanding of 
paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, arranged for an appraisal 
of said home around the date that said Decree was entered, and 
said appraisal appraised Defendant's equity as of November, 1975, 
to be $8,408.49. 
10. That based upon the circumstances surrounding the 
preparation of the final Stipulation and final Decree of Divorce, 
it is the belief of Plaintiff that paragraph 5 in the Decree of 
Divorce contains several typographical errors which transpose 
Defendant and Plaintiff, thus creating the now confusing result. 
<<r<i 
11. Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, as it now reads, 
provides that Plaintiff is awarded the use of the parties' 
marital residence until she desires to sell the said home, at 
which time the Defendant will have the first option to purchase 
Plaintiff's equity pursuant to an appraisal made as of the date 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
12. That Plaintiff, on February 2, 1981, and again on 
August 10, 1981, listed the said property to be put on the market 
for sale (as evidenced by Exhibit "B,!f incorporated by refernece 
herein), and Plaintiff advised the Defendant of such listings. 
13. That Defendant, upon being advised of Plaintiff's 
listing of the parties1 marital residence, did not attempt to 
exercise the above-described option to purchase Plaintiff's 
equity. 
14. That it is Plaintiff's belief that because of 
Defendant's failure to exercise his option under paragraph 5 of 
the Decree of Divorce, he has hereby waived the same. 
15. That Plaintiff, on March 26, 1984, married Terry 
Anderson, and notified the Defendant of her marriage to Mr. 
Anderson. 
16. That paragraph 5 of the above-described Decree of 
Divorce, provides that upon the remarriage of Plaintiff, 
Defendant shall have the first option to purchase Plaintiff's 
equity pursuant to the appraisal made as of the date of the entry 
£&o 
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of the Decree of Divorce, and Plaintiff shall have the option to 
purchase Defendant's equity if the Defendant fails to do so. 
17. That it is the belief and understanding of Plaintiff, 
that Defendant, having been notified of Plaintiff's marriage to 
Mr. Anderson, has failed to exercise his option to purchase her 
equity in said home, and has hereby waived the same. 
18. That pursuant to said Decree of Divorce, Defendant was 
awarded an equitable interest in said home, said sum being the 
sum of $8,408.89, together with one-half of the value of water 
stock, which value is the sum of $112.50, for a total of 
$8,521.39. 
19. Plaintiff, on or about April 7, 1984, and Defendant 
having waived his option on three separate occasions to purchase 
Plaintiff's equity, made arrangements for a loan to pa^ 
Defendant's equity and water stock value; however, Defendant 
failed and refused to sign a Quit-Claim Deed and receive his 
money. 
20. That on several occasions, Plaintiff has requested 
Defendant to cooperate in the accepting of the loan, and 
assigning of the Quit-Claim Deed, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the 
Decree of Divorce. 
21. Defendant has failed and refused to comply with the 
above-described terms and conditions of the Decree of Divorce. 
22. At paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce, it states that 
value of the equity to be purchased by either party v/ill be based 
tz y 
upon an appraisal to be made "forthwith to determine the equity 
as of this date . . . .n 
23. That paragraph 5 of the Decree of divorce states 
farther on that the equity is to be based on an appraisal and 
determination "as of the date of the occurrence of one of the 
above contingencies," 
24. That it is the belief and understanding of Plaintiff, 
that it is a standard practice that an appraisal is to be 
conducted at the time the Decree of Divorce is entered, if one of 
the parties is to assume the mortgage and continues to reside in 
the residence, and Plaintiff desired that said practice would be 
incorporated in the Decree of Divorce. 
25. That it is the belief and understanding of Plaintiff 
that it would be unfair to the latter interpretation of the 
valuation of the equity to occur in that in the last ten years 
since the parties1 divorce, she has maintained all the mortgage 
payments, property taxes, insurance premiums, all house 
improvement expenses, and to award Plaintiff one-half of this 
valuation is both grossly unfair and does not reflect what the 
parties intended at the time of the divorce. 
26. The Plaintiff desires of this Cour^: a clarification and 
determination as to the equity valuation contained in paragraph 5 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
27. That Plaintiff has been required to employ counsel in 
the bringing of this action, and that costs and attorneys1 fees 
in the maintenance of this action should be awarded to her in the 
form of a judgment against Defendant. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully moves the Court: 
1. For an Order requiring Defendant to execute a Quit-Claim 
Deed on the property located at 13227 South 2860 West, Riverton, 
Utah, and to accept the sum of $8,529.39 as his equity in the 
home and real property pursuant to the above-described Decree of 
Divorce. 
2. For an Order from this Court clarifying and determining 
the rights of the parties in regards to the option requirements 
as to the disposition of the parties1 marital residence, and as 
to the date of when an appraisal must have been conducted to 
value the parties1 equity at the time of the Decree of Divorce. 
3. For an Order granting judgment against the Defendant for 
reasonable attorneysf fees and costs incurred in the maintenance 
of this action. 
4. For such proper and other relief necessary under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this £ 3 day of September, 19 85. 
GUSTIN, ATOMS ,CASTING & LI APIS 
By // /KW^^/L -
Fra'njk R. P i g n a n e l l i 
! I 
Hi* -5- 7 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Gayla Hatch Anderson, being first duly sworn under oath, 
deposes and says: 
That she is the Plaintiff in the above-fentitled matter and 
has read the foregoing Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to 
Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Requesting Clarification of Decree 
and knows the contents thereof and that the same is true of 
Plaintiff's own knowledge except as to those matters stated upon 
information and belief, and, as to those matters, Plaintiff 
believes them to be true. 
\£ El GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON 
X jfeaay of Sept* SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / ^ 'da eptember, 
1985. 
XLA /6^U 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt La 
My commission expi 
ihltx 
VL/>4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Compel Defendant to 
Execute Quit-Claim Deed and Request for Clarification of Decree 
was rinly ma-ilpr! by plan'ng thp qamp~4.tL~.4-hQ Unitnri fltatas Maj-ls, 
gj3^t~age~p-rcpaidrat Salt Lake City, Utah, addressed to: 
Leyland K. Wiramer, Esq, 
Attorney at Law 
604 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
lis ' l^> DATED th  £^? day of September, 1985. 
(LU? 
HOLAtf J« 0L5EH 
Attornay for Plaintiff 
SX33 South Stgta 8tract 
Midvala? Utah 84047 
253*7176 
IK THS DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT^ IN AHD FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
GAYLA BATCH, 
Plaintlfft 
•va» 
HlCHASL HALL HATCH, 
Dafandant* 
S T I P U L A T I O N 
Civil Ho. 0*18898 
It la haraby atipulatad and agraad by « d batvaan plaintiff and 
dafandant paraonally and thair raapactlva counaal am follovai 
It Dafandant haraby conaanta that hla dafault ba antarad In this 
action by tha court# and vaivea hla appaaranca In aald action* Dafandant 
furthar waivaa tha ninaty (90) day waiting pariod and tha thraa (3) ©ouch 
lntarlocutary pariod following tha granting of tha Dacraa harein• 
2* Plaintiff ahall tharaupon praaant avidanca to tha court in 
aupport of tha allagatlona of har Cosplalnt on fiia harain* If tha court 
daaata atsch aridauaa auffldant to ward to plaintiff a Dacraa of Divorca £rcn 
dafandant, than Mid Dacraa, aubjact to tha approval of tha court, ahall 
provlda aa follcwat 
a* Plaiatlff nay ba awardad tha car a, cuatody and control of the 
two minor childran of tha partiaaf to^wlti Ji&aa Craig Uatch and Vanaaaa K*y 
Hatch, tubject to tha right of raaaonabla vlaltatlona by tha dafandant* 
v£U(? 
b# Plaintiff »*7 ba wax dad tha usa of tba ho&a and raal property 
locatad at U227 laath 2860 Vest, tlrertxm, Utah, subject to tha payment of 
the aortgaga tfesrtoa* unti l tba occurranca of cma of tba following contingenciei 
ccuwita tba reearrisge of plaint i f f $ tba youngest child raac.ss majority, or 
plaint i f f desires to aall said hcnef at which t int plaint i f f shall have 
f i r s t optica to purchaaa defendant's equity pursuant to an appraisal to b* 
msde forthwith to determine tha ecjuity aa of this data t aaid sppraisal to 
ba paid for by defendant^ snd dafandsnt shall h**s tba option to purchaaa 
plaintiff*a equity on tba occurrence of sny of tha abova contingencies in tha 
event plaintiff doaa not purchaaa defandant'a equity» aaid equity to ba basad 
on sa appraisal and datarmination aa of tha data of tba oceurranca of ona of 
tba abova contl&gemciaa* In tba event neither party exarciaa tha option to 
purchaaa said hoaa would ba sold and dafendant would racaiva tba aquity 
pursuant to tha Dacrea of Divorce and tha prasant sppralaal* 
a* Plaintiff may ba awarded aa bar sola and asperate property tha 
furniture, furnishings and fixtures, tba 1970 Bulck Riwlara autoaobllo snd bar 
personal belcmglngs* 
d« Dafendant migr ba awarded as his sola snd separate property the 
196* Dodge pickup and his paraonal belonging!* 
at Plaintiff shall ba ordered to aaetraa snd discharge tha oblig*_ 
tion due Faraars Adsdnlatratlen on tba eortgtge an tba hose* and dafendant 
shall ba ordered to aaauma snd discharge a l l otter debte snd obligations as 
sat forth by the divcrca Coepleint, as wall «> any end al l other debts zixd 
obligations incurred by tha parties durirg their marrltge and hold plaint i f f 
haralaaa therafrcau 
f* Defendant shall he ordered to pay to plaintiff the sua of 
9130*00 pay child par aoathf a total of $300*00 par month, far tha support 
and naintonanca of tha tiro olnor childron of tha pertiec* 
g* fleiatiff shall ha awarded no allaeny* 
h* Defendant shall ha ordered to maintain eadical insursnca on 
tha sdao* childron ond maintain his present Ufa insurance aaoritag tha minor 
children aa henaflclarles thereon* 
1* Defendant shall ha ordered to pay $330*00 additional attorney 
faaa to plaintiff's counsel herein* 
OtfSD this day of » if 73# 
SAYU UAWH, Plalntifi 
MUUN J. OLSai, Attorn*? lor PlalutiXf 
HlfflAEL HALL HAKH,' KtftaCni 
IZUHtt K.' UIWiKfl, ltteroay !©r"T>«f aslant 
Utah Savings Bldf., fait Lata City, Utah 
!<lb7 
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EXHIBIT " B " 
SALT LAKE BOARD OF REALTORS - MULTIPLE LISTING SERVICE 
ALL changes MUST fee rupofted within 48 HOURS by LISTING OFFICE or subject to fine 
Prop AHHro^ /'I 2? 7 . j> . ^ / ^ US Card# V y / f /
 ? I D # .7 4 ^ 
Company ^ V / -/47ss7*<s+// Date Reported W r V r ^ 
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COMPLETE APPLICABLE SECTION O N L Y : 
-fit 
STATUS (Check ONE Box ONLY): 
(Time Clause) T C. D Date 
(Reinstate) A D Date 
(Under Contract) . U • Date 
(All Closing Information) S • Date 
(Non Sale, Copy Attached) W D Date 
(Sold) S 
(FILL IN ALL INFORMATION) 
Date 
Price $ 
• 
Loan Type 
Selling Office I D # 
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Change^ 
Change 
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From 
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To 
To 
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5
 HORSE PROPERTY HOUSE SPOTLESS NEIGHBORHOOD 
OMPARABLF AND BETTER Al I R R I f K R p ^ T Rl IV 
APP OflYLfl HATCH Ph« 5 4 - 3 0 3 7 Show Ef'A? 
I* TAN PRIDEAUX ^ 4 8 5 - 3 6 6 5 ^ " A R R A N G E 'SO 
LoRW MQNSELL ™ 4 8 7 - 5 6 1 1 SOCy/. Hhp- : 
^rms C V , F H A , V A , C S , Q F 6 , 5 P O I N T - , FHA OK 
Bal$ 1 6 7 Q 5 0 F I X 
'mm^&^Mi^mmimmm^iM^ii^ Pmt$i25 F I T I M m 
LnTypeClTH^7-250 % 
To FARM HOME 
Taxes $A75 
Fee$ 
lot 1 0 0 X 3 / 4 A C R E 
Acres Jl 
^ i O Q 7 ^ 
Sold $ Date 
Trms 10 
Salt Lake - Residential Form 1 Res 5-81 
fL&g 
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FILE NO 35 - /#???* 
"ITLE: (^ PARTIES PRESENT) 
^ c c c . ( a ^ McCt7iA\ 
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County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
RLE NO. 
ITLE: ( • PARTIES PRESENT) COUNSEL: (* COUNSEL PRESENT) 
CLERK H0N. 
JUDGE 
REPORTER DATE: 
BAILIFF 
J A AM C. >JL 
Cfr(j n\ ,<xil ^ - \ CnjJLnl C^GL *^> oJiV daJ &p2^+s^x-g ^ 
PAGE. 
tf-yy 
"•^ 
»-'LU .N C! EflK'3 OFFICE 
OCT 9 1935 
LELAND K. W I M - M £ ^ ^ 3 l £ ^ 
Attorney for Defendant ^*-L^< «* 
604 Judge building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 H/Gitf. 
Telephone: 533-0538 
************************************ i^************ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIALJDISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH 
/Our 
GAYLA HATCH, 
plaintiff, 
- v s -
ORDER UPON HEARING OF 
PLAINTIFF'S ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE 
Civil No. 18898 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff1 s Order to Show Cause came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Sandra Peuler, Commissioner on the 9th day of May A.D. 1985. 
Parties were present and represented by each of their respective attorneys 
of record. After arguments of counsel and review of the file the Court 
being fully advised in the matter now on motion of Leland K. Wimmer i t i s 
h e r e b y o r d e r e d that the relief requested by plaintiff's Order to Show 
Cause be denied. /J 
DATED this y day oLKug&tA.D. 1985. 
By t h e C o u r t , 
Recommen 
Sandra Peuler, Commissioner 
Mailing Certificate 
H. DiXCN'-
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy bFffig foreaorng-
Order Upon Hearing of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause to Gayla Hatch a / k / a 
Gayla Hatch Anderson at 13227 South 2860 West , Riverton, Utah 84065, 
^ i c , vv f { K 'J 
tZdo nr 
FILMED 
FRANK R. PIGNANELLI (4392) 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 532-6996 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lako Cour.tv Utah 
I W IS J986 
H D » > W ^ ^ 
By 
Oeoutv Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo — 
GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH, 
Defendant, 
O R D E R 
Civil No. D-18898 
Judge Dee 
ooOoo >— 
Defendant's Objection to Commissioner Sandra Peuler's 
September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the above-entitled 
matter having come on regularly for hearing on November 6, 1985, 
at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable David B. Dee, one of the 
Judges of the above-entitled Court, and Plaintiff appearing in 
person and by and through her counsel, and Defendant having 
appeared in person by and through his counsel, and the Court 
having heard argument from counsel, and the Court being further 
advised on the premises and upon the Motion of Frank R. 
Pignanelli of GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for 
Plaintiff; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
&<?> 
1. That the intent of the Decree of Divorce entered by 
this Court on November 21, 1975, as evidenced by the Stipulation, 
is that the Defendant is to receive the one-half share of his 
equity based upon the amount of equity existing at the time of 
the Decree• 
2r That the Defendant is to receive his share of the 
equity in the parties marital residence at such time as the 
Plaintiff exercises the option to purchase Defendant's share of 
the equity, or upon the occurrence of one of the contingencies 
listed in Paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce. 
3. That if Defendant purchases Plaintiff's share of equity 
in the parties marital residence, Plaintiff's equity is to be 
determined as of the date of the occurrence of the listed 
contingency in paragraph 5 of the Decree of Divorce. 
4. That the Recommendations contained in Commissioner 
Peuler's September 30, 1985, Memorandum Decision in the 
above-entitled matter are affirmed. >, 
DATED this /^ day of ^ Liutu^, 19 86. 
BY THE COUBT: 
mr2rw-<* 
District Court Judge^ ,-
H. D I A O N i-iiiMOLEY 
; . ^ CLERK, A 
&q4 
S^"2t LJLI "A': E ' r - MAILING 
I h e r e ! . r e r t i i ir.c- ,- t: ^ - - iriMe 
—
 r n C ~ - — '"'ripv w^ cu . . mailed :* * *acmq tne &a. .t the 
wi ^ I c . , . wL« r * " a u i j c x x v . u u / i c w - , - ^
 r _* f i l l , 
adiressed * 
: . t ? J a i - ^- . i . i i . , i S s q . 
*;G4 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City '-^ a- 1 
DATED this day oi February, 198 6. 
RULE 5 Third District Local Rules UTAH CODE 1986-1987 
(b) All domestic relations matters, including 
orders to show cause, pretrial conferences, petitions 
for modification of a divorce decree, scheduling 
conferences, and all other applications for relief, 
except ex parte motions, shall be referred to the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner before any 
hearing may be scheduled before the assigned Dist-
rict Court Judge, unless otherwise ordered by the 
assigned judge. 
(c) The Commissioner shall, after hearing any 
motion or other application for relief, recommend 
entry of an order thereon, and shall further make a 
written recommendation as to each matter heard. 
Should the parties not consent to the recommended 
order, the matter shall be referred for further disp-
osition by the assigned judge. 
(d) Any party objecting to the recommended 
order or seeking further hearing before the assigned 
judge shall, within five (5) days of the entry of the 
Commissioner's recommendations provide notice to 
the Commissioner's office and opposing counsel 
that the recommended order is not acceptable or 
I that further hearing is desired. The Commissioner 
p shall then refer the matter to the assigned judge for 
j further hearing, conference or triahjfjio objection 
\ or requesffor' further Heafjng3s^made within five (5) 
r daysT^aicTparty shall- beTcieemed to have consented 
to entry of an order in conformance with the 
Commissioner's recommendation. 
(e) All recommendations of the Commissioner 
accepted by the parties shall be presented to the 
court and opposing counsel pursuant to Rule 4 of 
these Rules. All proposed judgments, orders and 
decrees must be approved as to form by the signa-
ture of the Commissioner before presentation to the 
assigned judge in the case. 
(0 Any party obtaining a temporary restraining 
order or other temporary order pending a hearing 
shall be responsible for obtaining from the assigned 
judge any extension thereof before the expiration 
date as may be necessary pending hearing before the 
Commissioner of the assigned judge. 
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen 
(15) days or such shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judg-
ment or decree in conformity with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed order, judgment or 
decree in civil and domestic cases shall be served on 
opposing counsel before being presented to the court 
for signature unless approved as to form by oppo-
sing counsel, or the court otherwise orders. Notice 
of objections thereto shall be filed with the court 
and served on opposing counsel no later than five 
(5) days after service of said proposed order, judg-
ment or decree. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be 
reduced to writing and presented to the court for 
signature within fifteen (15) days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
(d) Default judgments: 
Default judgments which require a judge's sign-
ature shall be submitted to the judge assigned to the 
case. Default judgments which* include an award of 
attorney's fees shall be supported by an attorney's 
fee affidavit which sets forth: (1) the legal basis for 
the award of the attorney's fees requested; (2) the 
amount requested; and (3) evidence that the amount 
requested constitutes a fair and reasonable fee for 
the services performed. 
RULE 5. PRETRIAL CALENDAR. 
This rule modifies Rule 5.1 of the Rules of Prac-
tice of the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the 
State of Utah. 
(a) Pretrial hearings in civil cases will be held 
when so ordered by the court. Pretrial hearings will 
be held before the judge who has been assigned the 
case. Motions for pretrial hearings may be filed at 
any time. Such motions shall set forth with partic-
ularity why a pretrial hearing is requested. The 
Court may order in any case that such motions must 
be accompanied by a proposed pre-trial order in 
the format set out in the Rules of Practice of the 
District and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah; or 
that such a pretrial order be prepared before a final 
settlement conference or trial date is set. 
RULE 6. JURY TRIALS - CIVIL. 
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Practice in the District 
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah shall 
not apply in the Third Judicial District Court. 
(a) Cases will be set for jury trial only upon the 
filing of a written demand for jury trial and the 
payment of the required statutory fee deposited with 
the clerk of court within the time provided herein. 
Such written demand for jury trial and the payment 
of the required statutory fee must be filed no later 
than ten (10) days prior to trial or at such other 
time as the trial judge may order. The court may in 
its discretion, upon motion, order a trial by jury of 
any or all issues. 
RULE 7. MOTIONS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL 
PROCEEDINGS. 
Motions for supplemental proceedings will be set 
on the regular weekly supplemental proceedings 
calendar before a clerk of the court. Counsel may 
alternatively schedule the matter to be heard before 
the judge assigned to the case on the assigned 
judge's regular law and motion calendar. 
RULE 8. DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
COMMISSIONER. 
(a) A Domestic Relations Commissioner may be 
appointed for the purpose of assisting the court in 
domestic relations matters as directed by the court. 
RULE 9. PROBATE. 
(a) The probate calendar will be assigned to a 
District Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rot-
ating assignment basis each January and July 1. 
(b) Pursuant to Utah Uniform Probate Code, 
Sections 75-1-201 and 75-1-307, the judge 
assigned to the probate division of the Third Judi-
cial District Court is appointed registrar to act in 
that capacity as required. 
(c) The probate clerk pursuant to Section 75-1-
401, Utah Uniform Probate Code is granted auth-
ority to order and schedule dates for hearing and to 
prepare the probate calendar of matters to be heard 
by the judge assigned to the probate division of the 
court. 
(d) Pursuant to Sections 75-1-102(1) and 75-1-
102(2) Utah Uniform Probate Code, the probate 
clerk is authorized to use the signature stamp of the 
assigned probate judge on informal matters prese-
nted to the court for handling. 
RULE 10. ADOPTIONS. 
(a) The adoption calendar will be assigned to a 
Distnct Court Judge in Salt Lake County on a rot-
ating assignment basis each January and July 1. 
_ (b) Pursuant to Section 78-30-14, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, pertaining to a 
request by the court for the Division of Family 
Services to verify the petition and conduct an inve-
stigation in adoptions, the petitioners shall, sixty 
4 8 4 For ANNOTATIONS, please consult tbe UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS £S2S*u2 
